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In decentralized finance ("DeFi"), automated market makers (AMMs) enable traders to programmatically exchange one asset for another. Such trades are enabled by the assets deposited by liquidity providers (LPs). The goal of this paper is to characterize and interpret the optimal (i.e., profit-maximizing) strategy of a monopolist liquidity provider, as a function of that LP’s beliefs about asset prices and trader behavior. We introduce a general framework for reasoning about AMMs based on a Bayesian-like belief inference framework, where LPs maintain an asset price estimate, which is updated by incorporating traders' price estimates. In this model, the market maker (i.e., LP) chooses a demand curve that specifies the quantity of a risky asset to be held at each dollar price. Traders arrive sequentially and submit a price bid that can be interpreted as their estimate of the risky asset price; the AMM responds to this submitted bid with an allocation of the risky asset to the trader, a payment that the trader must pay, and a revised internal estimate for the true asset price. We define an incentive-compatible (IC) AMM as one in which a trader’s optimal strategy is to submit its true estimate of the asset price, and characterize the IC AMMs as those with downward-sloping demand curves and payments defined by a formula familiar from Myerson’s optimal auction theory. We generalize Myerson’s virtual values, and characterize the profit-maximizing IC AMM. The optimal demand curve generally has a jump that can be interpreted as a "bid-ask spread," which we show is caused by a combination of adverse selection risk (dominant when the degree of information asymmetry is large) and monopoly pricing (dominant when asymmetry is small). This work opens up new research directions into the study of automated exchange mechanisms from the lens of optimal auction theory and iterative belief inference, using tools of theoretical computer science in a novel way. 

We consider the problem of A-B testing when the impact of the treatment is marred by a large number of covariates. Randomization can be highly inefficient in such settings, and thus we consider the problem of optimally allocating test subjects to either treatment with a view to maximizing the precision of our estimate of the treatment effect. Our main contribution is a tractable algorithm for this problem in the online setting, where subjects arrive, and must be assigned, sequentially, with covariates drawn from an elliptical distribution with finite second moment. We further characterize the gain in precision afforded by optimized allocations relative to randomized allocations, and show that this gain grows large as the number of covariates grows. Our dynamic optimization framework admits several generalizations that incorporate important operational constraints such as the consideration of selection bias, budgets on allocations, and endogenous stopping times. In a set of numerical experiments, we demonstrate that our method simultaneously offers better statistical efficiency and less selection bias than state-of-the-art competing biased coin designs.